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Abstract
Why do many firms in the healthcare sector adopt non-profit status? One argument is that 
non-profit status serves as a signal of quality when consumers are not well informed. A 
testable implication is that an increase in consumer information may lead to a reduction in 
the number of non-profits in a market.  We test this idea empirically by exploiting an 
exogenous increase in consumer information in the US nursing home industry. We find 
that the information shock led to a reduction in the share of non-profit homes, driven by a 
combination of home closure and sector switching. The lowest quality non-profits were the 
most likely to exit. Our results have important implications for the effects of reforms to 
increase consumer provision in a number of public services. 
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1. Introduction
Not-for-profit firms play an important role in the provision of health and social care in 
many countries (Thompson et al 2013). In ongoing debates about public service reform, 
not-for-profit provision is seen by many as desirable, particularly in services characterized 
by asymmetry of information, such as health and long-term care. It has long been 
recognized that, in such markets, non-profit status may provide a signal of quality (Arrow, 
1963, Hansmann, 1980, 1996; Easley & O’Hara, 1983; Weisbrod & Schlesinger, 1985; 
Hirth, 1999; Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001). The essence of the argument is that the quality of 
non-profit-provided services will be higher (compared to for-profits) because the non-
distribution constraint reduces the incentive to cut unobservable quality.1 It follows that 
because consumers expect higher quality, they will be prepared to pay a higher price for 
non-profit-provided services. Glaeser & Shleifer (2001) show that, as a result of the 
opportunity to charge higher prices and extract rents from the higher revenues, it may be 
optimal for even self-interested entrepreneurs to choose non-profit status. 
One implication of this is that changes in consumer information, which are the focus of 
many reforms in healthcare markets, may affect incentives for firms to adopt non-profit 
status and thus the composition of such markets. This implication of increasing information 
has not been recognized before and is the focus of our paper.  We examine what happens 
to the organizational composition of the market when consumers are exposed to an 
exogenous increase in information about the quality of service provision in a market 
previously characterized by asymmetry of information. In doing so we also provide an 
indirect test of the argument that one reason for the existence of non-profits is asymmetry 
of information.2  
A major reform in the US nursing home industry provides the exogenous shock to 
information on quality. In 2002 the Nursing Home Quality initiative (NHQI) instigated a 
discrete, exogenous increase in the availability of consumer-focused information on the 
quality of care in nursing homes. This mandated the publication of accessible quality 
information at the home level, aimed at consumers and made available in a widely 
publicized web based form, and subsequently shown to elicit responses from consumers 
and producers (Grabowski and Town, 2011; Lu, 2012; Hirth and Huang, 2015; Lu, 2016). 
1 The requirement that prohibits nonprofits from distributing residual revenue to those who control the firm.
2 There are many other arguments to explain the existence of non-profits, including tax-advantages, missions 
(Weisbrod, 2004), ideology and altruism (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). 
3This exogenous shock in consumer information aside, the nursing home industry is a good 
“test-bed” in which to study the relationship between information asymmetries and non-
profit provision for a number of reasons. First, the nursing home industry serves a 
vulnerable population – often represented by a family member – and is therefore 
characterized by asymmetric information and quality concerns (e.g., Hirth, 1999). Second, 
the nature of the service is such that nursing home residents often engage in one-off 
interactions with firms. Residents enter one home and switch infrequently. Thus there is 
little role for repeated interactions with a firm that may provide the opportunity for 
acquiring reputation for quality and negate the need to adopt non-profit status as a signal 
(e.g., Vlassopoulos, 2009). Third, non-profits have historically played an important role in 
delivery of care, and remain important, with roughly 30% of homes organized as non-
profits. 
We present a simple model, building on Glaeser and Shleifer (2001), to show how an 
increase in information provision would be expected to reduce the probability that a 
provider chooses non-profit status. We find strong evidence in support of this prediction in 
relation to nursing homes affected by the NHQI. Figure 1 tells the main story. It shows a 
decline in the share of non-profit providers in the nursing home market following the 2002 
reform. Regression analysis confirms the result. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, 
comparing the probability of market exit among for-profit and non-profit nursing homes 
before and after information was made available to consumers, we show that non-profits 
were six times more likely to “exit” the market after the reform compared to for-profits. 
We show that this exit can be explained equally by closure and by switching to for-profit 
status. Further, the response is relatively rapid, again suggesting that the non-profit status 
was a signal rather than a long term commitment to a different way of doing business. 
One possible alternative explanation for the exit of non-profits is that the reforms made 
consumers more quality elastic, resulting in exit of poorly performing homes. While this 
may have happened, our results suggest that this does not account for the higher exit and 
switch rates of non-profits following the reforms. We show that non-profits are on average 
of higher quality than for profits, that exit post-reform is higher amongst non-profits at all 
points in the quality distribution, and that amongst the lowest quality homes, non-profits 
are more likely to exit post-reform whilst for-profits are not.  This pattern would not be 
explained solely by consumers becoming more quality elastic post-reform, as an increase 
in quality elasticity would have led to higher exit amongst the lowest quality homes, which 
are for-profit. Thus there must be some other mechanism in operation: our model and 
4results suggest that is the differential impact of revelation of quality information on homes 
of different types.
In our design, we rely on two sources of variation in the availability of information to 
consumers to identify the effect of the reform, the first between states, the second at the 
within-state level. The first comes from variation in the timing of the scheme’s 
introduction. The reform came into effect in full from November 2002, but six states 
piloted the program from April 2002, while 17 states had their own information provision 
throughout the entire period.  The second is variation in the timing of data collection. 
Inspections of homes were on average annual but carried out at random times to prevent 
homes from ‘gaming’ the inspections.  But the reforms were implemented at a fixed date. 
This means that in the year in which the reform came into effect there are some homes 
which were inspected before the implementation date and some that were inspected after. 
We observe treated and non-treated homes in the same state in the same calendar year – 
and month – and can exploit differences between such homes. 
Our paper makes substantive contribution to a number of literatures. Our main finding – 
that an increase in information reduces the probability that an organization chooses non-
profit status – contributes to a literature on explaining non-profit provision in terms of 
information asymmetries. This explanation has been proposed by among others, Arrow, 
1963, Hansmann, 1980, 1996; Easley & O’Hara, 1983; Weisbrod & Schlesinger, 1985; 
Hirth, 1999; Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001, but there have been relatively few empirical tests. 
With regard to nursing homes, a number of studies have looked directly at the relative 
quality of non-profit and for-profit nursing homes using deficiency citations and staffing 
inputs as measures of quality.3  There is evidence of heterogeneity: for example, Chou 
(2002) found that non-profits provided better quality care than FPs to residents without 
family, but no better care than FPs to residents with family. Lu (2012) discusses the effect 
of the NHQI, focusing on the impact of quality of care. Using a difference-in-differences 
strategy she found that the reform affected consumer choices (low-scoring homes 
experienced declining market shares and revenues) and provider behaviour (scores 
improves for reported measures and deteriorate for unreported ones, deficiency citations, 
although she finds no evidence of changes in patient mix which would be consistent with 
3 Examples include: Gertler, 1989; Davis, 1993; Aaronson et al, 1994; Spector et al, 1998; Harrington et al, 
2001; O’Neill et al, 2003; Grabowski and Stevenson, 2008; Jones, 2015. There may be a concern that these 
do not capture all dimensions of quality that consumers care about.
5cherry picking).4 To date, however, no study has looked at the effect of the reform on 
provider mix in the nursing home industry.  
Our second contribution is to the literature on the effect of information provision on the 
operation of markets. One important theme in this literature is the unintended consequences 
of the publication of measures. To date, this literature has primarily highlighted actions by 
producers to manipulate their ratings, for example through selection of consumers or the 
diversion of effort to measured tasks. Examples relevant to the nursing home industry 
include the selection of ‘easier to treat’ patients; the provision of inefficient but less risky 
care in healthcare to ensure better performance on measured outcomes (e.g., Dafny & 
Dranove, 2003; Dranove et. al, 2009); the focus of effort on measured compared to 
unmeasured quality in nursing home (e.g. Lu 2012). Our paper highlights a different aspect 
of consumer information: the impact on the organizational form of producers.  Public 
service reforms in many countries have targeted underlying information asymmetries and 
provided ratings of (indicators of) service quality in the form of score cards and league 
tables. The goal is for consumers to make better-informed choices and to increase the level 
of competition with the aim of reducing monopoly rents in the market (e.g. Gaynor and 
Town 2012 in healthcare markets; Minter-Hoxby (2003) in education). If non-profit status 
is a signal of quality then these reforms to increase information in markets characterized 
by information asymmetries may also have an impact on the mix of provider types in the 
market. 
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the reform, while 
section 3 presents a simple model to examine the effect of increased information provision 
on provider status. Section 4 presents and data and describes our empirical strategy. Section 
5 presents the main results. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Nursing Home Quality Initiative
Our exogenous information shock is the effect of the Nursing Home Quality Initiative 
(NHQI). This was a mandatory information disclosure policy that represented a major 
innovation in the way that information on nursing home quality was made available and 
presented to consumers.
4 In a follow-up paper, Lu (2016) shows a similar quality response among not-for-profit and for-profit firms. 
Both improve against reported quality measures and deteriorate among unreported quality measures. Her 
explanation is that the improvement among not-for-profits is driven by a need to appeal to donors.
6Since 1995 all nursing homes in the US registered with the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) have been subject to random inspections that are carried out 
(roughly) annually by state inspectors.5  The inspections cover 190 regulatory standards 
relating to the quality of care provided, the quality of life of the patients and home 
administration. Failure to meet the standards results in a deficiency citation. Information 
from these regulatory inspections was disclosed online from 1998, but in a manner that 
made it hard for consumers to compare. 
The major innovation in the NHQI in 2002 was the systematic reporting of clinical quality 
through a “report card” for all homes, rather than simply the disclosure of deficiencies. 
CMS introduced a limited number of quality indicators indicators, including measures like 
“percent of residents with pressure ulcers” and “percent of residents who have lost too 
much weight”.6 The information was made available on an easy-to-search and highly 
publicized website, Nursing Home Compare. Figure 2 provides a summary snapshot of the 
information that was made available, showing a small sample of homes in a local area, 
summary information for one of the homes (which includes ownership status) and 
information for the home for each of the indicators for short-stay and long-stay patients. 
The policy was implemented nationally in November 2002. However, as shown in Figure 
3, it was piloted in six states (Colorado, Florida, Maryland, Ohio, Rhode Island, and 
Washington) in April 2002 (“early treatment states”). A second source of variation in the 
timing of treatment was that seventeen states (including four of the pilot states) had their 
own information disclosure websites prior to 2002 (“pre-treatment states”). We discuss in 
section 4 how we incorporate this variation in the definition of treatment.  
Lu (2012) reports evidence that Nursing Home Compare increased consumer awareness of 
nursing home quality information (“phone calls concerning nursing home information 
more than doubled and visits to medicare.gov’s nursing home quality information 
increased tenfold”). She also reports positive evaluations of the Nursing Home Compare 
website. 40% rated it 10 out of 10; 70%, 8+. The reform also had an impact on nursing 
home pricing, suggesting that both consumers and firms were aware of the information and 
responsive to it; Hirth and Huang (2015) show that homes revealed to be “high (low) 
quality” increased (decreased) prices in response to the introduction of information. 
Although not the focus of our paper, these pricing changes are predicted by the theoretical 
model we present in the next section.
5 Over 95% of nursing homes are registered with CMS (Strahan, 1997).
6 There were ten quality indicators in 2002. The number has grown since.
73. Framework
We present a simple model to illustrate the effect of information disclosure on a provider’s 
choice of organizational form. We build closely on Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) and model 
an entrepreneur facing the choice between adopting non-profit or for-profit status. To allow 
for a better mapping into our empirical environment, we extend the model in two 
directions. First, we allow for heterogeneity among consumers in distaste for deviating 
from their preferred level of quality. This proxies for mission and allows non-profits and 
for-profits to coexist even where they have the same cost function. Second, we compare 
two informational environments: (1) where consumers cannot observe service quality 
directly, but can only observe an organisation’s sector (for-profit or non-profit) and (2) 
where consumers can directly observe service quality, in addition to sector. We refer to 
these, respectively, as partial information and full information. Partial information, which 
matches the setup of G&S, roughly captures the pre-NHQI environment; full information 
roughly captures the post-NHQI environment.
3.1 Setup of the model
We start by describing the objective functions faced by a firm under the two regimes (full 
and partial information), conditional on their choice of sector. 
In a partial information regime, a for-profit (FP) entrepreneur i chooses quality (q) to 
maximize profits:
πiFP = z – m(q* – E(q|FP)) – c(qi) – bi(q*-qi)
where z – m(q* – E(q|FP)) represents consumers’ willingness to pay for a single unit of 
nursing home care. Willingness to pay depends on consumers’ perception of the 
entrepreneur’s deviation from the preferred or promised level of quality (q*). When 
consumers are only partially informed, this perception is formed based on the sector: 
E(q|FP). c(qi) represents costs faced by the firm; as in G&S, we assume this is an 
increasing, concave function, modelled c(qi)=qi2/2. Thus, z – m(q*-E(q|FP))-c(qi) captures 
the firm’s monetary profits. bi(q* - qi) represents the (potentially psychic) cost to the firm 
of deviating from the ideal level of quality.
A non-profit firm in a partial information regime chooses q to maximize:  
8πiNP =d[z – m(q* – E(q|NP)) – c(qi)] – bi(q*-qi)
This differs from the for-profit objective function only in that monetary profits are 
discounted by some amount d reflecting the (potentially imperfectly enforced) non-
distribution constraint faced by non-profits. We assume 0<d<1.
Under a full information regime, consumers directly observe a firm’s quality choice and 
consumer willingness to pay now depends on actual quality: z – m(q*-qi). Thus, for-profit 
firms under the full information regime maximize:
πiFP = z – m(q* – qi) – c(qi) – bi(q*-qi)
while non-profit firms maximize:
πiNP =d[z – m(q* – qi) – c(qi)] – bi(q*-qi)
3.2 Quality choice
Maximizing πi with respect to qi yields the following optimal choices:
 Under partial information,
o A non-profit’s optimal quality choice is qNP=bi/d.
o A for-profit’s optimal quality choice is qFP=bi.
 Under full information,
o A non-profit’s optimal quality choice is qNP=bi/d+m.
o A for-profit’s optimal quality choice is qFP=bi+m.
Note that, as in G&S, non-profits always provide higher quality than for-profits under 
partial information. We find that this is also true under our full information environment. 
We also find that both types of firms provide higher quality than they would under partial 
information.7 
 
7 An extension of the model with firms making distinct choices over dimensions of quality “reported” and 
“unreported” by Nursing Home Compare would suggest an overall increase in quality that is driven by a 
dramatic increase in reported quality paired with a deterioration of unreported quality, consistent with 
empirical findings from Lu (2012).
93.3 Sector choice
We now turn to the decision to adopt non-profit or for-profit status, which is made first. 
Under partial information, an entrepreneur of type bi chooses non-profit status if:
d[z – m(q* – E(q|I,NP)) – c(qNP)] – bi(q*-qNP)
 > z – m(q* – E(q|I,FP)) – c(qFP) – bi(q*-qFP)
Here, the expectation of quality E(q|I,NP) is based on whatever information I is available. 
(This additional notation is simply intended to allow us to talk about general decisions 
made across both informational regimes.) We will show that fewer firms adopt non-profit 
status under full information (E(q|I,NP)=qi).
We can rewrite the above to read:
bi(qNP – qFP) > (1 – d)(z – mq*)+m[E(q|F)-dE(q|N)]+(d c(qNP) – c(qFP))
Regardless of information type, qNP – qFP = bi(1 – d)/d. With some additional algebra, one 
can derive cutoff types in b that dictate when an entrepreneur would adopt non-profit status. 
Those cutoffs are below. (The cutoffs are not completely simplified to allow for more direct 
comparison.)
 Under full information: bi > [2d(1-d)-1[(1-d)(z-mq*)+0.5m2(1-d)]]1/2
 Under partial information: bi > [2d(1-d)-1[(1-d)(z-mq*)+m(E(b|FP)-E(b|NP))]]1/2
Note that, because there is a cutoff type in b above which non-profit status is adopted, 
consumers’ perception of b given non-profit status must be higher than their perception of 
b after observing for-profit status. In other words, the last term of the partial information 
cutoff is negative:  m(E(b|FP)-E(b|NP)) < 0. Because m>0 and d<1, the last term under 
full information is positive: 0.5m2(1-d)>0. The cutoff types are otherwise identical and so 
the cutoff type under full information is higher. Thus, fewer firms adopt non-profit status 
under full information.
3.4 Discussion
The model highlights how increasing consumer information can lead to changes in provider 
type. It yields two hypotheses that we take to the data:
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Hypothesis 1
An increase in information will make it less likely that organisations choose non-profit 
status. To test this, we compare the (change in) probability of exit among non-profits and 
for-profits once quality information becomes available. 
Hypothesis 2
Organisations that choose non-profit under partial information and for-profit under full 
information will tend to have a lower cost of deviating from consumers’ desired quality 
(bi). To test this, we look at variation in estimated treatment effects by initial quality.8 
4. Data and empirical strategy
4.1. Data
We study the universe of nursing homes registered with the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS). We draw from two overlapping sources. The first is the 
Medicare and Medicaid Provider of Services (POS) files, obtained through the NBER 
website.9 The second is Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting (OSCAR) data. Both 
are administrative datasets and are compilations of information, at least in part, from 
inspections conducted by state survey agencies and submitted to the Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS). 
The POS data, which cover all Medicare/Medicaid providers (i.e., not just nursing homes, 
but also hospitals, dialysis facilities), are available from 1984-2011. We restrict our 
analysis to the years 1999-2008, as a major change in Nursing Home Compare occurred at 
the end of 2008. Specifically, Nursing Home Compare began summarizing their 
information in simple “star ratings”. The data contain key information on the location of a 
nursing home (to the level of street address), ownership type (non-profit, for-profit), and 
8 Allowing for donations would reinforce these effects. As with consumers, non-profit status provides a signal 
of quality to donors under partial information and not full-information, changing the incentive to adopt NP 
status in the two regimes. Higher-quality firms would be better able to attract donors in the full information 
regime and would be more likely to retain non-profit status. As argued by Lu (2016), donations would also 
provide an additional incentive for non-profit firms to improve quality following the introduction of the full-
information regime. 
9 http://www.nber.org/data/provider-of-services.html
11
number of beds. For much of our analysis, this is all the information we need. Crucially for 
our analysis, nursing homes are identified throughout the panel by a unique 
Medicare/Medicaid provider number that is assigned to the facility itself (i.e. the physical 
structure of the nursing home), rather than the owners of that facility. This means that a 
facility maintains the same provider number even if, for instance, a non-profit nursing 
home is bought by new owners, who choose to operate as a for-profit. This feature of the 
data allows us to identify changes in ownership status.  
The OSCAR data report richer information from health and safety inspections, including 
information about staff and residents at each nursing home. We have OSCAR data for years 
after 1999, excluding 2002. On the staff side, we observe number of (full-time equivalent) 
workers employed by the facility, as well as some information about the level of 
qualification of those workers (registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, etc.). On the 
resident side, we observe the number of residents (as opposed to simply the number of 
beds), frequency of Medicare usage and frequency of Medicaid usage, and frequency of a 
variety of indicators of resident health. These include: presence of pressure sores, 
significant weight gain/loss, etc. 
The OSCAR data also contain a listing of the health deficiencies discovered in each 
inspection, and the severity of each deficiency. These deficiencies are an important 
component of the information provided through Nursing Home Compare and we use the 
same weights as Nursing Home Compare to summarize the list of deficiencies into a single 
measure, which are referred to as “deficiency points” for the remainder of the paper.10 A 
higher number of deficiency points indicates either more deficiencies, more severe 
deficiencies, or both. 
Our analysis focuses on non-profit and for-profit homes. We drop government homes from 
the data, which otherwise accounted for roughly 9% of observations. Our panel consists of 
149,839 home-year observations (105,390 FP and 44,449 NP) over the years 1999-2011 in 
the POS data. A survey period refers to the time between inspections, which are required 
to take place at least every 15 months; in practice the modal gap length is 13 months. 
10 Details on this can be found in Table 1 of the Nursing Home Compare Technical Users’ Guide 
(http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-and-
Certification/CertificationandComplianc/downloads/usersguide.pdf) but – in short – the scheme assigns each 
deficiency a number of points based on its severity and adds the points to obtain a single measure per facility. 
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Table 1 summarizes characteristics of non-profit and for-profit nursing homes across the 
entire sample period. There are relatively small but significant differences in a number of 
characteristics. Non-profits tend to be slightly smaller, are less likely to be part of a chain, 
have more care staff per bed, a higher share of Medicare payers and lower share of 
Medicaid payers, and to be rated of better quality in terms of having fewer deficiency 
points. These statistics suggest that non-profit homes are, on average, of higher quality than 
the for-profits. Further evidence on this is provided in Figure 4, which depicts the 
distribution of nursing homes in the nonprofit and for-profit sectors (respectively) across 
the four quartiles of deficiency points prior to the reform. The figure reveals that the lower 
average number of deficiency points in the nonprofit sector (as reported in Table 1) is 
driven by fewer nonprofit homes in the lowest quartile of quality and more nonprofit homes 
in the highest quality quartile.   
In our estimation we seek to rule out that these different characteristics explain our results. 
4.2 Empirical strategy
Our main estimating equation is of the following form:
Dit=a+bNP NPit*Treatedit+ bFP FPit*Treatedit + γ NPit + bs[years in current 
form]it+ct+di+eit (1)
Subscript i refers to a facility (denoted by provider code) regardless of owner, while t is 
time in months, corresponding to the precise timing of the inspection and the corresponding 
definition of the survey period. 
D is a binary indicator which takes the value one if the facility “exits” its current provider 
type in the time before the next survey. This means one of two things. Either there is a 
“switch” in ownership, meaning that the facility has changed provider type before the time 
of the next survey (a facility that was a non-profit is next observed as a for-profit or vice 
versa) or there is “closure”, meaning that the facility closes down altogether (and we do 
not see that provider code again). In other words, D is equal to one when a home is in its 
final (observed) period in its current form and 0 otherwise. Note that, because the unique 
identifier identifies facilities (physical structures) and not owners, we cannot observe 
whether “switching” is driven by an owner changing sectors, or a new owner taking over. 
Treated indicates if the disclosure requirement comes into effect during the time before the 
next survey (discussed further below), interacted with indicators for non-profit and for-
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profit status. Our test of hypothesis 1 involves these coefficients. Specifically we test H0: 
βNP = βFP versus HA: βNP ≠ βFP. We allow non-profits to have a differential exit rate prior 
to the reform (captured by γ). We include facility fixed effects (di), while month fixed 
effects (ct) capture general trends. We also control for how long a facility has maintained 
its current form (“[years in current form]it”). This measures the number of years a home 
with a given provider code has existed without closing or changing sectors. Throughout, 
standard errors are clustered at the state, unless specified otherwise.
Because the outcome variable becomes equal to one in the last period before a home 
changes sectors or closes, we code our treatment variable so that it indicates that treatment 
will occur before the next survey observation. Our simplest definition of treated is a binary 
indicator equal to one if consumers have information about the quality of nursing homes at 
any point during the time before the next survey. When the facility is observed in 
consecutive surveys, the definition of treatment is straightforward. The binary treatment 
indicator is equal to one for any facility whose next survey falls after the date of 
implementation (Nov 2002 for most states). In the case when the facility is not observed 
again, we use the modal 13 month survey gap to define the treatment variable. This means 
that the treatment variable will be equal to one for any facility whose last observed 
inspection survey was after the implementation date minus 13 months (i.e. after October 
2001 for a state implementing in Nov 2002). As well as a binary treatment indicator, we 
also construct a variable to capture the intensity of treatment, defined as the proportion of 
the time during a survey period, between inspections, when Nursing Home Compare is 
available to consumers. 
Variation in the treatment variable across homes comes from two sources - the timing of 
the roll out of NHC and the timing of inspections. The former varies across states and the 
latter varies within states. In terms of the timing of the roll-out, a pilot program was 
conducted in early 2002 and six states (Colorado, Florida, Maryland, Ohio, Rhode Island, 
and Washington) received the website in April 2002. The remaining 44 states received the 
website in November 2002. 
In addition to this, some states had their own state-level websites that provided information 
similar to Nursing Home Compare from the beginning of the sample period (1999).11 We 
refer to these as “pre-treated” states. While we know that such websites existed, there is 
11 These states are California, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New 
York, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin. This information is 
drawn from Lu (2012).
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state-level variation in the content provided and the degree to which consumers where 
aware of these websites relative to the highly-publicized Nursing Home Compare website 
(Castle and Lowe, 2005). For these reasons, coding the “pre-treated” states as treated for 
the entire panel may be associated with measurement error. Therefore, as our primary 
definition of treatment, we use the more conservative definition and define treatment 
relative to November 2002 (April 2002 for the pilot states). In a robustness test we adopt 
an “alternative treatment definition”, wherein we code the “pre-treated” states as treated 
for the entire panel. 
The second source of variation is the timing of the inspections within the year. The date of 
inspection is mandated by the Federal government to occur within a 15-month period and 
must be unannounced, with the goal of maintaining unpredictability in inspection date.12  
In practice, we find that the modal gap between inspections is 13 months. The effect of 
random timing on our definition of treatment is illustrated in Table 2 for states that 
implemented the program in November 2002. It shows the variation in the extent to which 
homes inspected in 2001 will be counted as treated depending on the date when the 
inspection occurred. Consider a facility inspected in September 2001. If it is re-inspected 
by the end of October 2002 (or not observed again), it will be considered to be untreated, 
while if it is re-inspected after November 2002, it will be considered to be treated. Any 
facility last observed after October 2001 would also be considered to be treated. 
In summary, we exploit both sources of variation, but our primary identification comes 
from the variation in inspection timing within states. 
5. Results 
5.1 Does increased availability of information affect provider mix?
Our model predicts that increasing information will make it less likely that organisations 
choose non-profit status. To test this, we compare the (change in) probability of exit among 
non-profits and for-profits once quality information becomes available. 
We begin by looking at exit rates in the raw data. Figure 1 in the Introduction showed that 
after 2002, non-profits’ share of the market fell. Figure 5 explores this further by examining 
12 Full details of inspection requirements can be found in the CMS State Operations Manual 
(http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Downloads/som107c07.pdf). The 
manual states: “The State has the responsibility for keeping surveys unannounced and their timing 
unpredictable.”
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exit rates, then splits exit into switching status (from non-profit to profit status in the case 
of non-profits, and vice versa for for-profits) and closure. Figure 5, Panel a, shows that 
overall exit rates (capturing both closure and sector switching) were similar for both types 
of home in 1999 and 2001 and then rose sharply in 2001 for non-profit homes, with the 
rate of exit for non-profits remaining significantly higher than that of for-profits for the rest 
of our sample period. Panels b and c show that this is primarily accounted for by the 
significantly greater propensity of non-profits to switch sectors from 2001 onwards. Panel 
b shows that switching rates are significantly higher for non-profits compared to for-profits 
for every year from 2001 at around 4 and (slightly less than) 2 percent respectively. In 
contrast, Panel c shows that while closure rates for non-profits rose in the early 2000 and 
remained higher than for-profits until the end of our sample period, the gap is much smaller 
than the gap between non-profit and for-profit switching rates.
Table 2 presents the regression results for the probability of exit. The coefficients on 
“Treated X Nonprofit” and “Treated X For-profit” are of primary interest, as they reveal 
the difference-in-difference estimates of treatment (quality disclosure) on nonprofit and 
for-profit homes respectively. Column (1) presents the estimates of equation (1) including 
facility fixed effects but excluding state time trends. It shows that non-profits are just over 
5 percent more likely to exit post-treatment. In contrast, there is no impact of treatment 
upon the exit rates of for-profits. The difference between non-profits and for-profits is 
statistically significant, as shown by the p-value on the difference in coefficient estimates 
for the two types of home. Column (2) allows for state-specific trends; results are little 
changed. Columns (3) and (4) examine switching and closure respectively. They show that 
the differences in exit rates were due both to switching and to closure. Consistent with the 
raw data, the regression results indicate that the treatment results in higher switching rates 
for non-profits but no change in the rate for for-profits.  
Although the “Treated” coefficients are our primary interest in Table 2, it is worth briefly 
noting the interpretation of other coefficients reported in the table. First, as one might 
expect, the longer that a home has existed in its current form, the more likely it is to switch. 
This is indicated by the “Age of Home” coefficient. The “Nonprofit” coefficient suggests 
that nonprofit homes are significantly less likely than for-profits to exit the market prior to 
treatment; in particular, they are especially less likely to switch sectors. This might seem 
at odds with the raw data depicted in Figures 4a, b, and c, which suggest roughly similar 
rates of departure in the pre-treatment period for nonprofit and for-profit homes. Recall, 
however, that specifications reported in Table 2 include facility-level fixed effects. Thus, 
the “Nonprofit” coefficient does not imply that nonprofit homes on average are less likely 
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to exit the market in the pre-treatment period; instead, the coefficient is identified from 
homes that switch sectors and therefore should be interpreted to mean that homes that have 
switched to nonprofit status during the pre-period are less likely to leave the market than 
those that switched to for-profit status.13
To confirm that there are not differential pre-treatment trends which would invalidate our 
research design, we estimate an event study of the exit rates of homes. Based on the modal 
gap between inspections of 13 months, we define a single period as 13 months. We then 
define the baseline date to be 1-2 periods before the date of NHC at which is introduced 
(so the date of NHC is denoted period 0) and estimate exit rates for each home for 
subsequent periods using all the controls in equation (1). Figure 6 presents the estimates 
for each sector. It shows that 3-4 periods before NHC was introduced exit rates were the 
same in both sectors, providing support for common trends pre-treatment. Post-treatment 
exit rates of non-profits rose each period while those of for-profits remained essentially 
zero.
Our main sample for the paper begins in 1999 because data used in further analyses are 
only available beginning in 1999. As a robustness check we repeat the analysis of Table 2 
and the event study of Figure 6 extending the pre-period to begin in 1994. This means the 
pre- and post-treatment periods have the same number of years. The results are reported in 
Appendix Table 1 and Appendix Figure 1. These show that our main results are robust to 
adding earlier years and that exit rates across early-treated and late-treated states (and 
nonprofits and for-profits) are statistically indistinguishable in not just 3-4 periods prior to 
treatment, but also multiple periods prior to that.14
Table 3 presents a number of alternative specifications. Column (1) reports the results of 
re-estimating our main equation with an alternative treatment definition. Specifically, in 
this specification, all of the states with a pre-existing, state-run, online nursing home report 
card are coded as “treated” for the entire panel. The estimates are qualitatively the same 
(non-profits are significantly more likely to exit than for-profits post treatment), but the 
estimated effect of the information release is lower, supporting the view that there is 
potential measurement error in this broader definition of treatment (because of variation 
13 While not reported in our results, if we instead estimate a specification which includes only state fixed 
effects (and not facility fixed effects), the coefficient on nonprofit is instead positive but much smaller in 
magnitude (0.017).
14 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this robustness test.
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across state in specific content and how usable the information released in the state-specific 
scheme was to consumers). 
Column (2) collapses the data to the state level. Collapsing the data to state level means we 
ignore any within-state variation in timing of inspection and revelation of quality 
information. Instead, we simply code homes as treated if their home state is treated for the 
majority of the year. This means that homes in “early treatment” states are treated in 2002, 
while remaining states are treated in 2003. The estimated effect remains significant while 
the magnitude is about one third of the size of our baseline estimate.
As our main identification strategy relies on both across and within state variation in timing 
of inspections our higher baseline estimate indicates that we get identification from both 
within and across state variation. We explore this further by defining treatment as the 
proportion of the period that a home was subject to greater information following the 
introduction of NHC. This exploits the variation in the inspection date. Thus, instead of a 
treatment dummy, here we employ a continuous treatment variable that runs from 0 to 1, 
where any fraction between 0 and 1 is possible (depending on the when the inspection falls 
in the treatment period).15 Using this definition, the estimated effect (presented in column 
(4)) is slightly higher than our baseline at just over 6 percent. 
Table 1 showed significant (though small) differences in observables between non-profit 
and for-profit homes. To check that these differences are not driving our results, we add in 
time trends in observed baseline characteristics (from OSCAR data) to our regression 
specification. Specifically, for each home, we take the mean of all of the characteristics 
reported in Table 1 in periods prior to treatment as baseline characteristics. We then interact 
all of these characteristics with a linear time trend. The results, presented in column (4), 
indicate that our estimated effect of the exit rate of non-profits is relatively unaffected. 
In the next column we further explore robustness to the differences between types of homes 
by limiting our sample to only those homes which share common support in terms of the 
rich set of observables available in the OSCAR data set. We use variables from the OSCAR 
data (summarized in Table 1) to predict the probability of being non-profit. We then 
remove all those homes that do not have common support plus the top and bottom 
percentiles of those that do and re-estimate our baseline model on this smaller sample. 
Column (6) presents the results. Again, results are very similar to our main result.
15 For example, a home that faces treatment starting the 5th month of a 13-month period between inspections 
would take on a value of 9/13ths in the treatment measure.
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5.2 Probing the mechanism: Heterogeneity in treatment effect across homes
The preceding results demonstrate that nonprofit homes are more likely to leave the market 
when informational asymmetry is reduced. In this subsection, we probe the mechanism 
generating this result and provide suggestive evidence that the main result is indeed driven 
by a change in the quality-signaling value of adopting nonprofit status. 
5.2.1 Are established firms protected from information revelation? 
Our first test considers whether homes that have been in the market longer at the time of 
treatment are affected differently by treatment than newer homes. Nursing homes that are 
well established in a market would be expected to have other ways of signaling quality, 
such as a brand, religious affiliation or reputation (see, for example, Malani and David 
2005). Given this, more established homes should be less likely to respond to public 
information on quality as they rely less on NFP status as signal quality.16 
To examine this we interact treatment status with the age (as a linear term) of the firm 
allowing the coefficients, as before, to vary by sector of firm.17  Age is measured simply 
as the number of years that a firm has existed in its current state (meaning, without 
switching sectors or closing). The results are presented in Table 3, Column (6). We find 
that the main effect for treatment for NP firms is positive and significant, suggesting that 
very young firms indeed respond to treatment by departing. However, the interaction term 
with age is negative and significant. These results taken together suggest that our main 
results are largely driven by newer homes, and the impact of treatment is diminished for 
homes that have spent more time in the market.  The size of the estimates are such that 
non-profits 9.2 years old and over (0.005*9.2 = 0.046) are not more likely to exit once 
treated. To provide some sense of how this might be interpreted, note that the average firm 
age is 7.76 years and the median is 8 years. As before, there is no impact of either treatment 
or the interaction with age for the FPs. 
16 Heutel (2012) provides a similar argument (and empirical evidence) in the context of charitable giving; for 
young charities, a government grant can lead to greater donations because the grant provides a signal of 
quality to donors. Donations to older charities are less affected by grants, as donors are already aware of their 
quality.
17 The age term is also entered as a linear term, which differs from the baseline estimates which only include 
age as a set of dummies.
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5.2.2 Are non-profit leavers of lower quality? 
Our second hypothesis is that the non-profit share of a market decreases with more 
complete information because firms at the lower end of the quality range that would choose 
nonprofit status comes to prefer for-profit status. Thus, in our empirical setting, we might 
expect that the firms that are lower quality before Nursing Home Compare are the ones 
that are most likely to depart once treated. To explore this, we examine the likelihood of 
departure as a function of pre-treatment quality measures interacted with treatment and 
sector dummies.
We split the sample into quartiles of pre-treatment quality. Quality is measured using 
“deficiency points” (the weighted average of deficiencies observed during inspections). 
We then estimate a variation on our main estimating equation wherein we fully interact 
dummies indicating “quality” quartile with our treatment dummy and sector indicators. 
Figure 7 presents the estimated treatment effects for the non-profits and for-profits. As 
predicted, it is indeed the lowest quality homes (4th quartile) that are especially likely to 
leave the market. The highest quartile versus lowest quartile estimates within this sector 
are statistically different from each other (p-value=0.015).  All within quartile cross-sector 
estimates are statistically different from each other. This makes it clear that it is the lower 
quality non-profits which exit, precisely those homes who have most to gain from non-
profit status when there is little information.18
5.2.3 Does the treatment effect vary by market power?
Finally, we consider whether nonprofit firms that face more competition within their local 
markets are more likely to depart when information is revealed. Firms with very large 
market shares may have very little reason to adopt nonprofit status simply as a signal of 
quality; consumers have little choice in such markets, so firms can charge a high price 
without constraining their profit making ability in order to signal quality. Thus, nonprofits 
in those markets are more likely to be run by “mission-oriented” entrepreneurs (Besley and 
Ghatak, 2005) and are not “for-profits in disguise”  (Hirth, 1999). Conversely, firms facing 
more competition have more need to signal quality to attract consumers (and/or charge 
higher prices) and therefore are more likely to use the non-profit signal as a quality marker. 
We therefore would expect to see a greater response to the release of quality information 
for firms that face more local competition.
18 The results are very similar using sector-specific quality quartile. Available from authors on request.
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To test this we interact treatment with the degree of competition that the home faces. 
Specifically, we measure each home’s county bed share (number of beds / beds in county) 
in the year prior to Nursing Home Compare, and assign a dummy to homes that control a 
low degree of competition (county bed share exceeds the 75th percentile within the county), 
a dummy to homes that face a high degree of competition (county bed share is less than 
the 25th percentile), and a dummy for remaining homes that are not at extremes of market 
power. 19 Figure 8 present the estimated probability of exit and 95% confidence intervals 
for non-profits and for-profits for the three groups. The figure shows the probability of exit 
is highest in homes that face the most competition and lowest for firms that control a large 
fraction of their market. The treatment effect is close to three times as large as the treatment 
effect estimated in the main analysis. While exit rates are also highest for for-profits that 
face the most competition, the exit rate for these firms is significantly lower than that of 
non-profits.
6.  Conclusions
Policy makers globally have sought to increase information in public service markets to 
overcome monopoly arising from information asymmetry and enable consumers to make 
better choices. Where information is poor, some firms in these markets may adopt non-
profit status as a signal of quality. The corollary is that when information is revealed such 
firms will exit or switch status. 
This paper tests this for an industry in which non-profits play a significant role: the nursing 
home industry. We exploit the introduction of a nationwide policy to increase the 
information available to consumers on the quality of nursing homes. We exploit variation 
across homes within states arising from the timing of inspections and variation in the date 
of introduction across states to test whether firms exit the non-profit sector once 
information is revealed. Using data on a panel of just under 15,000 nursing homes -- 
(nearly) the universe of homes – throughout the United States, we find that they do. Non-
profits are roughly 5 percent more likely to exit after information is revealed. In contrast, 
for-profits are not more likely to exit. The response is rapid and it is those firms that are 
predicted to adopt non-profit status for non-mission reasons that are more likely to be 
affected. These are homes that are at the lower quality of the distribution and homes in 
19 A baseline year is adopted to avoid concerns surrounding endogeneity of bed share.
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highly competitive markets. They respond both by exiting and changing status to for-
profits. 
The results are robust to potential concerns over differences across firm type pre-policy. 
They are given further credence by the fact that firms that have greater incentives to signal 
quality by adopting non-profit status when consumer information is poor – those that are 
younger and operate in less concentrated markets more competitive markets – are precisely 
those firms that are more likely to stop being non-profit after information disclosure.20 
Our results have implications for the importance of the non-profit form in public service 
markets. In all these markets (schools, hospitals, long terms care) non-profits have 
historically played a large role. In all these markets, information disclosure is becoming 
more important and regulators are seeking ways to make information more accessible to 
consumers in order to stimulate choice and competition.  Our results suggest that adoption 
of non-profit status as a signal of quality cannot be sustained post-revelation of a true (or 
better) quality signal and that the provider mix in these industries will change.
20 The empirical pattern we detect is consistent with the “nonprofit as quality signal” argument. By contrast 
Malani and David (2005) drew the opposite conclusion from looking at whether organisations chose to signal 
their non-profit status (e.g., in local adverts). They found that organisations that have other signals of quality, 
such as a religious affiliation, are less likely to signal that they are non-profit and that organisations are also 
less likely to signal when they have to pay (e.g., for yellow page ads). Even among organisations that have 
no other indicators of quality, 30 percent of nursing homes never signal their status on their websites. 
However, as we have shown and as would be expected, the non-profit signal is more important in some 
contexts (for newer firms and when competition is high) than in others. Alternatively, we also note that 
Malani and David’s data on nursing homes comes from after the introduction of Nursing Home Compare. A 
strict interpretation of our model would suggest that firms are no longer announcing sector because they no 
longer need to, and that salient announcement of sector may have been more prevalent before Nursing Home 
Compare.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variables Nonprofit For-profit Difference
(NP-FP)
Total beds 107 111 -4.343***
(1.37) (0.55) (1.482)
Total residents 88.2 92.5 -4.270***
(1.20) (0.49) (1.294)
Occupancy rate 0.84 0.83 0.00776**
(0.0028) (0.0014) (0.00309)
Care staff / bed 0.69 0.57 0.113***
(0.017) (0.0078) (0.0186)
Share: Medicare payers 0.18 0.13 0.0503***
(0.0038) (0.0011) (0.00394)
Share: Medicaid payers 0.50 0.67 -0.166***
(0.0043) (0.0019) (0.00466)
Share: Other payers 0.32 0.20 0.115***
(0.0033) (0.0014) (0.00358)
Deficiency points 37.5 50.5 -13.04***
(0.46) (0.37) (0.589)
Bed share of county 0.20 0.20 -0.00404
(0.0045) (0.0028) (0.00529)
Age of home 8.39 8.88 -0.493***
(0.036) (0.019) (0.0402)
Observations 22,636 62,314
Robust standard errors (clustered at facility level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Table reports means of variables used later in the paper from throughout the entire sample (meaning all 
home-year combinations in the panel). The third column tests whether there are differences across nonprofit 
and for-profit homes. Sample period: 1999-2008. Data source: OSCAR Resident and Staffing Survey.
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Table 2: Difference-in-difference estimates of the probability of exit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Exit Exit Switch Closure
Treated X Nonprofit 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.016*** 0.034***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Treated X For-profit 0.007 0.006 -0.004 0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Nonprofit -0.172*** -0.178*** -0.149*** -0.023***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.005)
Age of home 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Constant -0.014 -0.015 0.011 -0.021***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.006)
Observations 137,374 137,374 137,374 137,374
R-squared 0.361 0.364 0.242 0.425
Facility and month FE’s X X X X
State-level trends X X X
Treat X NP – Treat X FP 0.0431 0.0477 0.0201 0.0244
P-Val. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Robust standard errors (clustered at the state-level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Exit = 1 if the facility exits its current provider type in the time before the next survey – either changes provider 
type or closes down. Switch = 1 if the facility changes its current provider type in the time before the next survey. Close 
= 1 if the facility closes down (is not observed again). Treated =1 if Nursing Home Compare is in effect at any point in 
the time before the next survey. NP and FP are indicators for non-profit and for-profit status respectively. The facility 
refers to the physical structure of the nursing home. Sample period: 1999-2008. Data source: Provider of Services files
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Table 3: Robustness tests and additional results
Dependent variable = Exit (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Alt. treatment Agg'd. to 
state
Cont. 
treatment
Baseline 
chars. Trends
Common 
support
Age of home
Treated X NP 0.029** 0.016** 0.062*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.046**
(0.012) (0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.008) (0.018)
Treated X FP -0.014 -0.000 0.016 0.007 0.002 0.018
(0.010) (0.005) (0.016) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012)
Nonprofit -0.181*** 0.028*** -0.174*** -0.171*** -0.141*** -0.208***
(0.023) (0.005) (0.020) (0.021) (0.026) (0.024)
Treat. X NP X Age -0.005*
(0.003)
Treat. X FP X Age 0.000
(0.001)
NP X Age of home 0.017***
(0.003)
Age of home 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -0.012 0.040*** -0.016 -0.019 -0.014 -0.003
(0.014) (0.004) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 137,374 996 137,374 136,842 103,682 137,374
R-squared 0.363 0.495 0.364 0.345 0.399 0.366
Facility and month FE’s X X X X X X
State-level trends X X X X X X
Treat X NP – Treat X FP 0.0433 0.0164 0.0461 0.0401 0.0460 0.0272
P-Val. 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
Robust standard errors (clustered at the state-level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes : Exit = 1 if the facility exits its current provider type in the time before the next survey – either changes provider 
type or closes down. Treated =1 if Nursing Home Compare is in effect at any point in the time before the next survey. 
NP and FP are indicators for non-profit and for-profit status respectively. The facility refers to the physical structure of 
the nursing home. In “Alt. treatment def.” (Column 1), a state is coded as treated if Nursing Home Compare is active in 
their survey period or if they are in a state that had its own nursing home report card website prior to Nursing Home 
Compare. “State-level specification” (Column 2), aggregates exit rates to the state-sector-year level. “Intensity of 
treatment” (Column 3) allows for a continuous treatment variable that runs from 0 to 1. In the year that states become 
treated, the treatment variable is assigned as the proportion of time between current survey and next survey that Nursing 
Home Compare is active. “Baseline (pre-treatment) chars.” (Column 4) interacts pre-treatment home characteristics (from 
Table 1) with time trends, using OSCAR data. Column 5 uses the OSCAR data to identify homes with common support 
based on OSCAR characteristics. Column 6 only differs from the main specification in that it interacts treatment and 
sector with age of home. Sample period: 1999-2008  Data sources: Provider of Services Files and OSCAR data
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Figure 1: Non-profit and for-profit nursing home providers
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Notes: Figure plots stock of homes by sector, normalized to 2002 stock. That is, each point in the Non-profit (NFP) series 
is [Number of Non-profit homes in year t / Number of Non-profit homes in 2002]. Data source: Provider of Services files
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Figure 2: Comparison information, Nursing Home Compare screenshots
29
Notes: Each panel is a screenshot from a separate section of the Nursing Home Compare website, retrieved in March 
2015. The first panel is the main listing of homes after entering a location search (e.g., zipcode). From there, consumers 
select a home which takes them to the home’s profile (picture in the second panel). Additional details of the quality of 
service in the home (pictured in the third and fourth panels)  can be found by navigating further from the home’s main 
profile.
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Figure 3: Roll out of nursing home comparison websites
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Figure 4: Distribution of deficiency points (quality measure) across sectors in year 
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Note: The figure depicts the share of nonprofit homes and for-profit homes (respectively) in each of the 
four quartiles of deficiency points, which serves as a measure of quality. Fewer deficiency points implies 
higher quality.
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Figure 5: Exit rates, non-profit and for-profit nursing homes
a. Exit rates
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b. Switch rates
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c. Closure rates
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Notes:  Figures show sector-year specific sample means of exit, switching, and closure rates together with 95% 
confidence intervals for the years 1999-2008.
(a) Exit = 1 if the facility exits its current provider type in the time since the past survey – either changes provider type 
or closes down. Exit rate = Number of exits in sector / # of  homes in sector. (b) Switch = 1 if the facility changes its 
current provider type since the past survey. Switch rate = Number of switches in sector / # of homes in sector. (c) Close 
= 1 if the facility closes down (is not observed again) in year following last survey. Closure rate = Number of closures in 
sector / # of homes in sector.
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Figure 6: Event study
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Notes: Figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from an event study estimation. The time period is 
“survey period”, which we define as lasting 13 months (the modal length between surveys). Thus, “0-1 after” is 0 to 1 
survey periods after (or 0-26 months after) treatment. “1-2 before” is the omitted category. 
Figure 7: Variation in treatment effect by quality of home
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Notes: Figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from a regression fully interacting treatment (and sector) 
with “quality quartile”. The figure displays estimates of interaction between treatment, quality quartiles, and sector. 
Quality quartile is based on average deficiency points prior to treatment. A higher number of points indicates lower 
quality, so first quartile is the highest quality.
Pairwise comparisons: 4th quartile nonprofit coefficient is significantly larger than 1st quartile nonprofits (p-val.=0.01), 
2nd quartile nonprofits (p-val.=0.06), and 3rd quartile nonprofits (p-val.=0.03). No other pairwise comparisons amongst 
nonprofits are significant.
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Figure 8: Variation in treatment effect by competition faced
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Notes: Figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from a regression fully interacting treatment (and sector) 
with degree of competition faced. The figure displays estimates of interaction between treatment, quality quartiles, and 
sector. Degree of competition is based on a home’s bed share within its county in a base year (2001). Low bed share = 
Homes where within-county bed share is below the 25th percentile. High bed share = Homes where within-county bed 
share is above the 75th percentile. Medium bed share = remaining homes. 
Pairwise comparisons: Low bed share nonprofit coefficient significantly higher than medium (p-val.=0.00) and high bed 
share (p-val.=0.00). Medium bed share nonprofit coefficient significantly higher than large (p-val.=0.06). Low bed share 
for-profit coefficient significantly higher than medium (p-val.=0.00) and high bed share (p-val.=0.00).
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APPENDIX
Appendix Table 1: Difference-in-difference estimates of the probability of exit 
(Longer panel, starting in 1994)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Exit Exit Switch Closure
Treated X Nonprofit 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.017*** 0.033***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007)
Treated X For-profit 0.013 0.011 -0.002 0.012*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007)
Nonprofit -0.103*** -0.110*** -0.093*** -0.018***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.004)
Age of home 0.003** 0.004*** 0.002* 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Constant 0.091*** 0.066*** 0.039*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 210,600 210,600 210,600 210,600
R-squared 0.299 0.303 0.172 0.351
Facility and month FE’s X X X X
State-level trends X X X
Treat X NP – Treat X FP 0.0358 0.0427 0.0189 0.0215
P-Val. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Robust standard errors (clustered at the state-level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Exit = 1 if the facility exits its current provider type in the time before the next survey – either changes provider 
type or closes down. Switch = 1 if the facility changes its current provider type in the time before the next survey. Close 
= 1 if the facility closes down (is not observed again). Treated =1 if Nursing Home Compare is in effect at any point in 
the time before the next survey. NP and FP are indicators for non-profit and for-profit status respectively. The facility 
refers to the physical structure of the nursing home. Sample period: 1994-2008. Data source: Provider of Services files
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Appendix Figure 1: Event study (Longer panel, starting in 1994)
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Notes: Figure reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from an event study estimation. The time period is 
“survey period”, which we define as lasting 13 months (the modal length between surveys). Thus, “0-1 after” is 0 to 1 
survey periods after (or 0-26 months after) treatment. “1-2 before” is the omitted category. 
